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Abstract
In this paper I want to explore personal learning: I want to start by examining two personal experiences of learning that point
to problems in learning theory. The issues that I want to explore relate not only to my theory of learning but to many other
theories as well.
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1. Introduction
Let me start by saying, however, that there are a wide variety of theories of learning proposed by some
excellent scholars: Knud Illeris (2009) has collected sixteen of these together in his excellent Contemporary
Theories of Learning and I have tried to demonstrate the complexity of learning in my two International
Handbooks (Jarvis, 2010, 2012a). Many of these theories are extremely insightful and point to some of the
different ways of understanding learning and this paper is not offered as a critique of any of these works - its aim
is to try to extend our understanding of learning even further.
I want to start with a slightly modified example of personal learning: it is one that I used in a recent
philosophical paper on learning that I published (Jarvis, 2012b) entitled It is the Person who Learns. My first
example is a contemporary one:
Experience 1: As an international traveller I am often taken into restaurants which serve the indigenous
foods: this is my preference in my travelling. I leave it to my hosts to choose from the menu – and when my food
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arrives there is sometimes something on the plate that I do not recognise, and so I ask my hosts what the food is –
they tell me. And so, firstly, I learn its name – a cognitive experience. Then I taste it and I decide whether I like it
or not. Secondly, then I learn a taste – this is a non-cognitive experience. Thirdly I learn whether I like it or not –
an emotive and cognitive experience. Fourthly, then I am left with other questions afterwards – whether I will
recognise the taste when I decide to have the food again and will I be able to associate it with the food that I have
eaten – I am less than confident that I can – and so I have learned something about my confidence which is
emotive and something more, perhaps, about myself.
This is a common and almost trivial incident about everyday learning yet we rarely analyse it like this to see
the learning processes. I do not want to take all of these points in this presentation but I do want to take three of
them - learning the name, learning the taste and deciding to try the food again: thereafter I want to ask a further
question about learning itself in the context of a second story of learning. These then are four points about
learning theory but then I want to draw some conclusions about learning theory and learning practice.
2. Learning the Name of the Food
When I am taken to the restaurant, I ask my hosts what the food is and they tell me its name. The name is a
piece of information which I am given and which I try to remember and learn. It is a name that my companions
know because sometime in the past they have learned it too - and so they can check that when I use it in future
discussion, that I have got it correct. Like them, I have processed the information and stored it in my memory:
this is a normal process - just like a computer taking in information and processing it and storing the data in its
memory ready for future use. In this sense the brain processes the information and has apparently stored it - but
there are a number of problems here some of which I want to explore, the first being the most obvious - where is
the information stored? In the brain, you might say - but this is where the problems begin. Steven Rose (2005,
p.162) in his excellent book The 21st Century Brain answers the question thus:
Once again, memories are system properties, dynamic, dependent, for each of us, on our own unique
individual history. What they absolutely are not is ‘stored’ in the brain in the way that a computer stores a file.
Biological memories are living meaning, not dead information.
In fact there are other theories of memory which suggest that since memory traces cannot be found in the
brain, memories can be stored in time and recalled through a process of resonance with the past (Bergson, 1912;
Sheldrake, 2012, pp. 187-230). And so the brain is not like a computer and learning is not quite information
processing! Or to put it another way - information processing may be one small part of learning and learning
theory. But retrieval of information presents us with more problems and so, therefore, does the theory of learning
as information processing.
3. Learning the Taste of the Food
And so I taste the food and find that I like it - now I have learned another two new things: I have learned a
taste and an emotion. Let me deal first with the emotion - I like what I have tasted. Perhaps it is because I liked
the taste that I remembered the name better because we know that emotional memories are more powerful than
purely cognitive ones (Rose 2005, p.164). But can I reduce the emotion to a material phenomenon? If I cannot,
then it cannot be processed by a computer-like brain, and this is almost certainly the case. Additionally, the taste
causes us similar problems and I want to focus on it here: taste is a sense but it is not cognition and so - how do
we learn it? But more than that - when I learned the name of the food my companions could check to see that I
had learned it correctly - but they cannot do the same with taste! There is just no way in which they can know
what I tasted. Nor is there anyway of me knowing what they tasted. This form of learning is entirely subjective
and personal.
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And so what does this mean? Taste is a quale which cannot be processed by a computer like cognition. In
fact qualia cannot ever be reduced to units that can be processed by a computer-like brain. The real mystery of
the taste is that the food has any taste at all in the first instance and so I might want to ask the question - did the
taste exist before I tasted it? But when I say that ‘it tastes like something else’ - nobody can check it - they don’t
know what my taste is, nor what my experience of ‘the something else’ was either! No materialistic argument can
ever explain this - taste cannot be reduced to a materialist phenomenon. Taste is always subjective and personal -
the experience of qualia is always at the heart of consciousness itself - you see ‘consciousness is always what it is
like for me’ (Feser, 2005, p.104). This, then, is quite mysterious but what the real mystery is, as Feser (p.105)
says, that we - as persons - should have any subjective experience of taste (or of sensations of any other qualia) at
all.
Now this causes problems in this scientific age because the subjective has always been ignored. We have
measured learning by what we have learned correctly - like the name of the food - or the effect that the food has
on my future behaviour because it has in some way affected the chemical combinations of my body - but never
by its taste! The dietician knows about these effects, but science ignores subjective feelings - the scientific world
has always sought the objective - but we cannot objectify taste (or any other qualia). Nor can we reduce it to
anything else. The essential thing about that taste is that it is essentially private - personal - it is my personal
learning.
But if I cannot reduce that taste to a materialistic phenomenon, then what is it? It is in some way non-
material: is it ‘spiritual’ then? Certainly this suggests that the brain is other than, or not only, a computer-like
mechanism - it points us to the fact that we have a mysterious thing called the mind which may be part of the
brain - or not. This is a point that Descartes (2000 edition) reminded us about in the seventeenth century and the
dualist debate is one that we still cannot avoid in learning theory.
4. I decide to eat the food again
If I decide to try the food again, you could say that that is proof that I had learned to like the taste - but this is
not necessarily so - it could have been because I was not too sure about it, or even that I did not like it when my
friends actually appeared to like it, and so on. Consequently, my action is no proof of my like or dislike of the
food and no indication of what the taste is. However, I am now confronted with another problem - if I decide to
taste the food again - this is a matter of my intentionality.
But when I say to my friends ‘I will try a little more’ - the words are just sounds, but they signify a mental
state - an intention - although in another context they can mean something else. However, I cannot reduce that
mental state to a physical one - I cannot reduce intentionality to something physical - once more it is a sign of the
immaterial which underlies my action. Underlying the words is meaning and the intention to try a little more of
the food - the meaning of the sentence cannot be reduced to the physical.
If we now return to our computer-like brain - the intention cannot be reduced although the words themselves
could be deconstructed and the computer print out another sentence that may or may not convey the same
meaning. What the brain cannot do is to signify intentionality, in the same way as it could not signify taste. There
is something other than the objective computer-like brain processing this experience, or these experiences. It is
not a material phenomenon - but a non-material one.
Now once we reach this stage we reach a very interesting conclusion - the study of learning cannot only be a
scientific research project - it is not only a piece of physical or biological research - it is much wider. Indeed, the
study of learning is also metaphysical - as well as physical - and so I am now forced to ask the question again -
precisely what is learning?
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5. What is Learning?
My illustration about learning is learning from the sensation of eating a food and taste: in a sense then it tells
us something about learning - it is in some way a response to sensation but the fact that I taste the food and my
intention to eat more are something other than responses to external sensations - they are about mental states. But
as we look around the world - much of life can be typified as a response to sensation: indeed, if we look at the
non-human world we can see the same thing. If we think of an insect or a plant, we can see that if there is
something in the way of the insect as it moves it changes direction in order to find food or dodge an object in its
path; if we think of a plant, it turns and faces the sun to get the warmth from the sunlight - and so on. In both
cases, there is a response to whatever sensations the external world creates in the living organism - and in this
sense we could say that some form of learning had occurred - just like the behaviourist theory of learning - S-R,
but in these instances there is no consciousness of it (or at least we do not think that it is, although we cannot
prove it) and so the question must be posed, but not answered here yet, can learning occur without conscious
experience?
In precisely the same way I had an experience once in Japan which has impressed me ever since.
Experience 2: I was travelling with a Canadian scholar and we were met off the train in the city of Fukuoka
by a Japanese professor - we got into his car and he drove us to our hotel. In this instance I was sitting in the
front street with the driver. After we had checked in at the hotel, we left our room keys at the reception and we
were driven into the city. After an hour or so, our host had to excuse himself as he had a meeting which he had to
attend. He took us to the railway station and told us - the hotel was just four stations on that specific line. OK -
we had no problems at the time and after a meal we went any purchased our tickets, got on the train and went out
four stations: then the problems began - we did not read Japanese! We were not sure which was the main exit
and so we followed the crowds. But the problem was compounded because when we reached the main road, we
did not know where our hotel was - nor did we know its name because we had left our keys at the reception! We
could not ask anybody - we did not know where to ask for! We walked up and down the side roads for about 45
minutes and then, suddenly, standing in the middle of the road at a junction - I knew where the hotel was and
said to my companion if we go down this road, there is a dog-leg turning and the hotel is directly beyond it on the
right-hand side. We walked to the dog-leg and sure enough the hotel was there - but how do I know? I did not
know - the next morning we retraced our steps and began asking how I knew - and then it dawned on me - when
we were brought there the previous day I was sitting in the front seat of the car, but in the evening I was standing
in the middle of the road - in both instances I experienced almost precisely the same picture (sensation) - but I
could only recall the first because I was there the second time.
For many years after this experience I just regarded this as a pre-conscious learning experience and that it
became a learning experience when I brought it to my conscious mind. Now, in one sense this might have been
true - but I now want to revisit this experience with a number of questions:
• When I was sitting in the car and as we turned into that road, I had no idea that the hotel was just beyond the
dog-leg in the road that I had just entered and neither do I recall reflecting on it when we arrived at the hotel,
and so when did I make the connection between turning into that road and the location of that hotel?
• When I was in the street seeking for the turning for the hotel and not finding it - had I been given a precise
photograph of the scene from the middle of the road - would I have been able to say where the hotel was? Or
did I need to be able to repeat the whole experience before I was able to recall it?
• Did I need to be in the precise space before I could bring the previous experience to mind? Did I need to
recreate the past before the present became meaningful? Certainly the memory cannot be confined to a
cognitive experience - it was more than that. Was my memory a sort of resonance between the space and the
time?
• If I could recall this one event in this way - how many others from that journey might I have been able to
recall given precisely the same circumstances? But once we accept this - does this occur throughout the
whole of conscious life?
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Once we begin to ask these questions about consciousness and experience, we see that we are entering
troubled waters. When did I actually learn the connection between the situation that I saw and the hotel? Did this
occur in the same way as I learn when I am asleep - the brain continues to be active processing our experiences
and then in some way they are stored away. But what if they are not stored in the brain?
We know that when we go to sleep, we do not stop learning - we often say ‘Sleep on it!’ During sleep we are
alive but hardly conscious - and yet the brain is continuing to work in some way - or is it the mind that is still
operating? We continue to learn. Van der Veen and Archer (2012,pp.256-264) have investigated the relationship
between sleep and learning and they record that at different times during sleep the brain is active - it suggests that
there is some form of memory consolidation. However, like all physical studies of the brain, they cannot study
the content of the thoughts - they cannot find the mind! But we know that at times when we are asleep we
actually do learn something about the things we have been thinking about. In a sense, our living has not stopped
because we are not fully conscious: learning is in some way a feature of living itself but the question that remains
is - is learning restricted to conscious living or is learning about change and capability in a living organism - as
Illeris (2009,p.7) suggested? It appears that learning is an interactive response to the sensations of externality - it
is a personal expression of living- usually in the conscious state, but not necessarily so! But when we are asleep,
the sensations are internal or at least we are continuing to learn from them - so our brain is still processing the
sensations that we experienced either consciously or unconsciously in some manner previously.
Learning then is a response to an external sensation - it is storing away memories in the brain or somewhere
else, like time, but we do not know where or how since we find retrieval a very difficult thing to understand. It is
my personal response to a unique situation which is stored away - in this sense it is a building block of ‘Me’ -
myself. When I have the intention to act on the ‘Me’ - it is the ‘I’ that intends it and determines how to act. The
‘I’ is more than the memory - it is more than anything material - it is non-material: it is in some way
intentionality itself - but thinking about the memory is more than just the changes in the neural system in the
brain. The ‘I’ is the driving force of the ‘Me’ - the life force if you like. But as a person - a self - I am a
combination of the ‘Me’ and the ‘I’ - and I learn to be myself (see also Jarvis, 2009). In a sense learning is
something that is more than just my consciousness - it is a feature of my living itself - but consciousness is an
intrinsic part of it, and without consciousness I would not know that I had learned!
This explanation is, naturally, very useful and points me in the direction of how my individual self emerges
through the learning process - but as we learn more about Eastern thought, so it is necessary to ask questions
about the nature of individualism, and consequently about the nature of ‘I’ and ‘me’.
6. Concluding Discussion
Now we are in a position to return to the original remit for this paper - to try to understand more about
personal learning. I started with learning and not with theories about it so I want to conclude in the same way: in
order to understand learning -
• we should not start with the theory but with the practice;
• we should not be confined to the scientific/materialist approach;
• we should use the theories that reach beyond traditional learning theories since to understand learning we
have to understand living itself - both in human and other forms of life.
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We should not start with the theory because few of the theories include all the elements of human learning
including experience and sensation: theories, such as information processing, meaning transformation, and so on,
give us an incomplete understanding of the whole learning process although they may be correct about those
aspects that they study.
We should not be confined to the scientific/materialist perspectives because the mind is non-material although
it is in some way related to the brain: we are engaged in a metaphysical as well as a scientific enterprise when we
seek to understand learning and few of the current theories of learning engage in this wider discussion.
We should recognise that the relationship between living and learning demands that we use theoretical
approaches that go beyond traditional theories of learning since while learning is a universal phenomenon it is
also very subjective and very personal.
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